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JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COURT OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE COURTS OF THE
MEMBER STATES*
ARTHUR LENHOFF**
I
INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS
Also from the standpoint of supranational jurisdiction and adjudication,
the three European Communities created in the nineteen-fifties require partic-
ular attention.468 These Communities are based on treaties entered into be-
tween the "Six," as the member States are usually called, i.e., Belgium, France,
(West) Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and The Netherlands. Those treaties are
the Paris Treaty of 1951 (in effect since July 23, 1952) on which the European
Coal and Steel Community, hereinafter called E.C.S.C., is founded, the Rome
Treaties of 1957 (effective date January 1, 1958) which established the Euro-
pean Economic Community, hereinafter called E.E.C., and the European Atomic
Energy Community, called Euratom. For the purpose of the following discussion
the E.C.S.C. and E.E.C. are of particular significance while Euratom on the
whole reflects the legal features of the E.E.C. Treaty.
The bases and operations of the Communities cannot be considered under
the aspect of mere international treaties regulating relations between states.
This is manifested by many features, as will be seen. The effect of regulations
and decisions of the organs of the Communities upon member States as well as
private parties is one of them.
For the purpose of carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by the Treaty, the
E.C.S.C. Treaty authorizes the High Authority-its chief executive-to issue
decisions which are binding in any respect.469 However, it would be a mistake
to identify the term "decisions" in the sense as applied by the Treaties with an
adjudication of a particular situation. The term covers much more than an
individual adjudication. This can be seen from the E.C.S.C. Treaty which dis-
tinguishes between "individual" and "general" decisions. 470 The Court of
Justice-hereafter this Court of the Communities will be designated as
* This article constitutes the Appendix to Chapter VI of the author's book on Juris-
diction and Judgments: A Comparative Study, which the Parker School of Foreign and
Comparative Law (Columbia University) intends to publish.
The footnotes in this article are numbered as in the original manuscript.
** Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, State University of New York at Buffalo,
School of Law. D.U.J., University of Vienna, Austria; Professor of Law, University of
Vienna (until 1938); Judge of the Austrian Constitutional Court (1929-1934); admitted
to practice in New York, 1946.
468. This double aspect is the justification for the inclusion of the problems within
a special sector of this Chapter.
469. E.C.S.C. treaty article 14.
470. Cf. E.C.S.C. treaty articles 14, 33 and E.E.C. treaty article 189. Buergenthal,
Appeals for Annulment by Enterprises in the E.C.S.C., 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 227, 247 (1961).
JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
"Court" 471-has defined a "general" decision as a quasi-legislative measure
creating norms which might be applicable erga omnes. 472
The similarity of such general decisions with statutory enactments is
expressed in more distinguished terms in the E.E.C. Treaty. By article 189 of
this Treaty, the Council and the Commission-the latter is the chief adminis-
trative organ of this Community-are authorized to frame regulations and
directives, to take decisions and to issue recommendations. The "regulations"
have been compared with our Federal statutes because they establish general
rules which are directly applicable without the need of member state
legislation. 473
In order to achieve common rules, the Council shall, as articles 100 and
101 of the E.E.C. Treaty prescribe, issue directives for the harmonization of
the laws and regulations of the member States which directly affect the estab-
lishment or operation of the Common Market or for the correction of differences
between the laws of the member States where such laws interfere with the
conditions of competition on the Common Market.
Regulations enacted by the organs of the Communities within their
sphere are directly binding upon member States. Decisions (in the narrow
sense) of these organs obligate directly the member State and the private parties
to which they relate.474 Furthermore, the treaties impose the duty on the
member States to take, on the one hand, all general or particular measures
which are appropriate to ensure the carrying out of the obligations arising out
of the treaty in question and, on the other hand, to abstain from any meas-
ures which might jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the treaty.4 7 5
It is true that if legislative or administrative acts of a member State are
in conflict with its obligations under the treaty, the Court cannot annul those
acts. So the Court itself declared in Humblet v. State of Belgium.476 However,
the Court added: "If the Court declares in its judgment that a legislative or
an administrative act of a member State violates Community law, then this
State is required under article 86 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty to repeal this act and
to remedy the legal consequences caused possibly by this act. This obligation
471. Since October 7, 1958, one single court of justice of the European Communities
exists. Thus, by this court the Court of Justice of E.C.S.C. was replaced. In similar manner
the single Assembly has replaced the Common Assembly of the E.C.S.C. Cf. articles 1 and 3
of the Rome Convention on Common Institutions of the European Communities of
March 27, 1957. For an English translation of this Convention see 51 Am. J. Int. L. 1000.
472. Court, Firma Nold v. H. A., case no. 18-51, 5 Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des
Gerichtshofes (hereupon called Slg.) 89, 112 (1958). Cf. Buergenthal loc. cit. (note 470
supra) 247.
473. Stein and Hay, Legal Remedies of Enterprises in the E.E.C., 9 Am. J. Comp. L.
375, 376 (1960).
474. See E.E.C. articles 7, 85, 86 and E.C.S.C. articles 65, 66.
475. E.E.C. treaty article 5. The provision in the E.C.S.C. treaty article 86 is even
more direct in the command. "The member states bind themselves to take any appropriate
general and particular measures to assure the execution of their obligations . . . and to
refrain from . . ."
476. See the reasoning of the Court in case no. 6-60 of December 16, 1960, Humblet
v. State of Belgium, 6 Slg. 1163, at 1184; J (Clunet) 1962, 478.
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(of the State) follows from the treaty . . . which has the force of law within
the territories of the member States as a result of their ratification and which
has precedence over national law." 477
Also according to the E.E.C. Treaty, a judgment of the Court affirming
such a violation of a member State's obligation imposes the duty on the State
to comply with the judgment which means to enact the necessary legislative
or adriinistrative changes. 47 8 In the case of non-compliance by the State with
such declaratory judgment of the Court, it is left to Council and Commission
to decide whether any measures and what kind of them should be taken for
obtaining compliance; for the E.E.C. Treaty itself-in contrast to the E.C.S.C.
Treaty--does not provide for sanctions against the State.470
The foregoing discussion brings into focus features of Community law
tellingly explaining why the Communities cannot be likened to mere interna-
tional organizations. There is, first, the supremacy of Community lav over
State law, including the constitutional aspects of the latter. Second, many of
the legislative, quasi-judicial and administrative decisions of these organs, i.e.,
the Council (composed of representatives of the member States), the High
Authority of the E.C.S.C., and the Commission of the E.E.C. have binding
effect also upon private parties with respect to the activities of the latter.
Third, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over a member State is not
conditioned on voluntary submission; a fact which presents a remarkable
example of an encroachment on the traditional area of sovereignty.480 Fourth,
the validity of an official act of a member State can be questioned by the
organs of the Community or by another member State. Fifth, even private
parties are subject to Treaty provisions controlling their activities. Further-
more, they have a standing before the Court 48 ' and may even, where Com-
munity law so provides, institute proceedings in the Court against their own
State.482
All this helps to make the point that the six European States are welded
in two single supranational units for certain vital purposes.
It goes without saying that the Communities are legal persons which
can sue and be sued in the State courts. 483 In the light of international law the
Communities present a form of composite state sui generis. The E.E.C. is a
customs union,4 4 but it is much more than that. Its principal purpose of estab-
477. Id. at 1184, referring to E.C.S.C. article 88.
478. E.E.C. Treaty article 171.
479. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, Commentaries on the E.E.C. Treaty 127 (1960, in
German).
480. E.E.C. Treaty articles 169-171. The contrast to the condition upon which the
International Court of justice can assume jurisdiction is obvious.
481. See E.C.S.C. Treaty article 33(2) and E.E.C. Treaty articles 173(2), 175(3).
482. Humblet v. State of Belgium, quoted in note 476 supra, 6 Slg. at 1188/9.
483. E.C.S.C. Treaty article 6; E.E.C. Treaty article 211.
484. 1 Groeben and Boeckh op. cit. (note 479 supra) p. XIII and XIV. Ouin,
Establishment of the Customs Union (in 1 Stein and Nichelson, American Enterprise in
the European Common Market) 101 (1960).
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lishing a common market requires the coverage of almost all fields of economy
and even of the control over competition and of the regulation of restrictive
business agreements and practices.
'Naturally, serious legal difficulties are encountered by the complex rela-
tion between Community law on the one hand and the laws of the member
States on the other. Obviously, the very objectives of the Communities call
for uniform interpretative decisions on all matters within the scope of the
treaties which means within the wide area of their application. On the other
hand, the activities of the business enterprises are subject to the jurisdiction of
both the Communities and the member States. The desire to create an inde-
pendent judicial organ that has the function to find solutions of the intricate
problems involved points to the raison d'&re of the multinational48 5 Court.
II
THE RELATION BETWEEN JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND THAT OF MUNICIPAL
COURTS IN MATTERS NOT BASED ON COMmUNITY LAW
(aa) The jurisdiction of the Court has an exceptional character.48 6 The
scope covered by it is limited. In this sense article 183 of the E.E.C. Treaty
declares that, subject to the authority conferred upon the Court by the Treaty,
jurisdiction over disputes to which the Community is a party is not withdrawn
from the national courts. For this reason it would be unjustified to read a general
jurisdictional clause into the articles 31 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty and 164 of the
E.E.C. Treaty. Despite the general language used in these articles (the wording
of which is quoted in the margin 48 7) a court review cannot be obtained of
each and every aspect of the activities of the executive organs of the Com-
munities. 488
There are very few types of private-law litigation which fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court. It is of course true that litigations between
the E.E.C. and its employees fall, according to the Treaty, under the jurisdiction
of the Court,489 and that its decision will not be controlled by state law but
by the Regulations concerning "the service for officials and the conditions of
employment for other employees." 4 90
However, by contrast, no such exclusive jurisdiction of the Court exists
485. The seven judges of the Court are appointed for a term of six years by agree-
ment among the Six. E.E.C. Treaty article 167(1), E.C.S.C. Treaty article 32a-c.
486. Bebr, The Relationship Between Community Law and the Law of the Member
States (in Int. L. and Comp. L.Q. Suppl. publication no. 4) 8 (1962) and in The Relation
of the E.C.S.C. Law to the Law of the Member States: a Peculiar Legal Symbiosis, 58
Colum. L. Rev. 767, 769 (1958); Ropers, Conflict Between the Court of Justice of the
Communities and the National Jurisdiction, 36 JCP 1962.1.1709 (in French).
487. The wording of these articles reads: "The Court shall ensure observance of law
and justice in the interpretation and application of the treaty."
488. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 109. See there also the reference
to contrary views.
489. E.E.C. Treaty article 179.
490. By article 212 of the E.E.C. Treaty the Council has been authorized to enact,
in collaboration with the Commission, such a regulation.
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over this type of litigations where the E.C.S.C. and its employees are concerned.
In the first decision rendered in such a case the Court pointed out that its juris-
diction is based on article 42 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty on which the plaintiff-
employee heavily relied, and on article 27 of the Internal Regulation of De-
cember 1, 1953.491 The reference to these provisions, particularly article 42,
shows that where the Court entertains the proceedings, it is the parties' will
which has conferred jurisdiction over such a matter on the Court. It goes with-
out saying that in the absence of such conferment the municipal courts would
have the jurisdictional authority to hear and to decide such litigations.
Simultaneously, this remark serves to underscore two important facts.
First. Concerning subject-matter jurisdiction, the scope of jurisdiction of the
Court under the E.E.C. Treaty is not coextensive with that provided for
in the E.C.S.C. Treaty.
Second. As for matters other than those subject to the jurisdiction of the
Court, the Communities are not exempt from the jurisdiction of the national
courts and other national authorities; for the Protocols (integrated in the
Treaties) concerning Privileges and Immunities of the E.C.S.C. and of the
E.E.C. grant them only the usual relief from taxes and custom duties, and
warrant the inviolability of their premises and so on. Naturally, also the
taking of measures of forced execution by courts or administrative agencies
of the national states against property, including claims, of the Communities is
restricted by the Treaties; such executionary measures are not excluded but
they can be taken only upon an authorization on the part of the Court.49 2
(bb) Thus, as a rule, state courts maintain their jurisdictional power
over the Communities in all litigations arising out of contracts and other
transactions. As the first paragraph of article 215 expressly states, the law
which according to the conflict rules of the forum controls the contract at
issue, must be regarded also as determinative with respect to matters relating to
the responsibility of the Community.49 3 There are two exceptions. But the
exceptions concern only the jurisdictional delimitation between the Court
and the national courts. They do not go to the applicable law because in
neither of the exceptional situations Community law is to be applied.
The first exception concerns litigations arising out of contracts of the
Communities. The Treaties provide for concurrent jurisdiction. The Court
491. Court, Kergall v. Common Assembly of the E.C.S.C., case 1/55, 2 Slg. 9, 21.
According to article 42 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty the Court shall exercise jurisdiction where
it may be so provided in a contract to which the Community is a party or which is under-
taken on its behalf. For the conclusion that the jurisdiction in such disputes is one created
only by the parties' choice, see also the Official Comments (Denkschrift) of the German
Federal Government on the E.E.C. Treaty as to § 179 (in German).
492. E.C.S.C. Treaty article 76 and Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of April 18,
1951; E.E.C. Treaty articles 218, 239 and Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of April 17,
1957, particularly article 1 cl. 3.
493. The law of Belgium, within the territory of which, i.e., in Brussels the seat of
the organs of the E.E.C. is, will in the absence of a different intent of the parties be
regarded as the controlling law. Cf. 2 Groeben and Boeckh op. cit. (note 479 supra) 188,
359.
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is competent to adjudicate such a litigation only if the parties to the contract
have therein conferred jurisdiction on the Court. 494
In the second place, the Court possesses' exclusive jurisdiction over actions
against a Community for damages caused through the fault of an organ or an
employee of the Community in the course of his function.495 The E.E.C.
Treaty refers in article 215(2) to "the general principles common to the laws
of the member States," as to the legal source for the liability of the Com-
munity in cases of this type.
True, the corresponding provision of the E.C.S.C. Treaty-article 40-
does not contain such a reference to the general principles of the law of
the member States. However, in Algera v. Common Assembly the Court
held that in the absence of a Treaty rule resort must be taken to the "rules
recognized in legislation, doctrine, and decisions of the member States." 496
Accordingly, with respect to either Community not only the question of damages
but also the questions as to whether the act of the organ or of the employee
was a faulty official act (faute de service), that is, a service-connected fault,497
and whether liability requires a certain higher degree of culpability 49 5 -wilful-
ness or gross negligence-are to be determined on the basis of those general
principles. From the first paragraph of article 40 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty can
be seen that the regulation of the jurisdiction of the Court over such claims
follows the same line.
However, the Court has no jurisdiction over actions against the E.E.C. for
damages caused by wrongful acts committed by an official or employee outside
his official activities. Such wrongful acts are called "personal faults.1499
Accordingly, the adjudication over such claims belongs to the courts of the
member State within the territory of which the act was committed. 500
At this point it is interesting to note that the E.E.C. Treaty departs from
the E.C.S.C. Treaty in the jurisdictional approach as well as in the matter of
494. E.E.C. Treaty article 181; E.C.S.C. Treaty article 42.
495. E.E.C. Treaty articles 178, 215(2); E.C.S.C. Treaty article 40, Protocol on the
Privileges and Immunities of the E.E.C. article 11(a).
496. Court, July 12, 1957, Algera et al. v. Common Assembly, (E.C.S.C.), cases 7/56
and 3-7/57, 3 Sig. 83, 118 [the action was based on the unlawful revocation of provisions
of the regulation concerning terms of service of the plaintiffs in question].
497. The French Council of State has for more than 100 years developed, without the
help of legislation, the liability of the state for damages caused by service-connected faults
of officials and employees of the state. However, the state has been held not to be respon-
sible if the illegal or tortious act of the officer or employee is not connected with the exer-
cise of his official duties; and is therefore a "personal fault." For the French theory see the
Conclusions of the Commissaire, Conseil d'Etat July 26, 1918 (Lemonnier), S.1918.1I.41.
It is not disputed that the draftsmen's approach to these questions was strongly influenced
by the French doctrines.
498. In the Algera case, note 496 supra, 3 Sig. at 133, the Court brought up the
question of the kind of culpability required, but did not hold it necessary to decide the
question because the procedural irregularity committed by the organ of the defendant
presented a sufficient basis for the latter's liability. Id. at 133.
499. For the distinction between personal faults and service-connected faults see note
497 supra.
500. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 363.
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responsibility of the Community toward third parties for wrongful acts of
officials or employees committed at the occasion of their services, but not directly
connected with their performance50l According to the second paragraph of
article 40 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty the Court is clothed with exclusive jurisdiction
over claims of this kind raised against officials and employees or against the
Community. However, the Treaty limits this vicarious liability of the
Community in two ways. On the one hand, the Community is liable only if it is
impossible for the injured party to recover damages from the tortfeasor. On
the other hand, the Court can charge the Community only with "equitable
damages." According to this concept, adopted by the German and Belgian
civil codes for a certain type of case, the Court in determining the extent
of compensation has to take into account the individual circumstances, parti-
cularly also the economic situation of the claimant. 0 2
Turning to the E.E.C. Treaty, we see that the Court lacks jurisdiction over
a claim of a third party against the Community for this kind of faults of
employees. Such claims belong to the jurisdiction of the national courts. 0 3
It may be added that Community law based on the treaties and other
supranational enactments and decisions denies the Court as well as the national
courts jurisdiction over claims of third parties against an official or employee
for damages caused by service-connected faults. The exclusion of the jurisdiction
of the Court follows simply from the silence of the E.C.S.C. Treaty and the
E.E.C. Treaty. Concerning national courts, the Protocols on Privileges and
Immunities, mentioned previously, have granted officials and employees of
the Communities exemption from State jurisdiction as to acts performed by them
in their official capacity, including speeches and writings.504 However, since the
Communities are burdened with the liabilty for damages caused by such acts,
the injured parties are not prejudiced by the exemption.
It should be noted that the third paragraph of article 215 of the E.E.C.
Treaty refers the question of the personal liability of officials and employees
toward the Community to the Service Regulation and Terms of Employment.5°5
According to article 179 of this Treaty, jurisdiction is to be exercised by the
Court in proceedings concerning this liability.
On the point of the liability of the employees toward the E.C.S.C. the
Personal Regulation for the former contains a provision according to which
the rights of the latter to indemnification from the former presupposes a
particularly high degree of culpability in the exercise of their functions
501. Also the adoption of the term "personal fault," peculiar to French administra-
tive law, demonstrates the influence of French law upon the E.C.S.C. Treaty in this matter.
See article 40(2) of the E.C.S.C. Treaty.
502. E.C.S.C. Treaty article 40(2) (cl. 2). As for "equitable compensation," see German
BGB § 829, Belgian civil code (as am. 1935) art. 1386 bis.
503. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 365/6.
504. Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the E.C.S.C. of April 18, 1951
article 11(a) and Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the E.E.C. of April 17, 1957
article 11(a).
505. For these regulations see article 212 of the E.E.C. Treaty.
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or at the occasion thereof.506 However, in contrast to the E.E.C. Treaty, the
E.C.S.C. Treaty does not vest the Court with jurisdiction as to matters relating
to the employer-employee relationship. The reasons why, therefore, the juris-
diction of the Court must also in this matter be regarded as the result of the
parties' will rather than of a command of the Treaty, has been discussed in
the preceding pages.
III
CoumT: TH SCOPE OF ITS EXCLUSIVE POWER TO DETERMINE
COMMUNITY-LAw MATTERS
(a) Logically, the discussion of this jurisdictional subject requires first
of all an answer to the question of what is Community law. From previous
discussions in the Introductory Subsection, it could be seen that the concept
of Community law is not coextensive with the rules laid down directly in the
E.C.S.C. and E.E.C. Treaties, their annexes, annexed Protocols and implementing
Conventions;5o7 it reaches far beyond that. All the regulations and general
directives laid down by the governing organs of the Communities-the Council
and the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. and the Commission of the E.E.C.-
and their decisions, particularly the "general decisions" rendered by them, and,
subject to some limitations, their recommendations and opinions, much as
these types of legal norms may differ in form, scope and binding effect,508 are
part and parcel of Community law.50 9
Since the Treaties have given the Communities the power to enter into
international agreements or arrangements on certain matters, 510 it stands to
reason that these agreements fall likewise within the scope of Community
law.511
As will presently be seen, one of the main duties of the Court is that of
deciding whether the previously mentioned legislative, quasi-legislative, quasi-
judicial, or administrative acts of the organs of the Community are con-
sistent with the Treaties to which they refer and with the limitations placed
therein upon their authorization.
Equally, the normative effect of the decisions rendered by the Court must
not be overlooked. The Court is the supreme interpreter of the Treaties and
other sources of Community law.-Like the- decisional law of the highest
506. Personal regulations concerning the Personnel, article 14.
507. E.C.S.C. Treaty article 84, E.E.C. Treaty article 239.
508. For these differences between the various normative utterances of the supreme
organs of the Communities, from regulations down to recommendations, see article 14 of
the E.C.S.C. Treaty and article 189 of the E.E.C. Treaty. Cf. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op.
cit. (note 479 supra) 165-199.
509. All these normative utterances of the organs have been called the "legislation of
the Community." Mathijsen, Le Droit de ]a Communaut6 Europ~enne du Charbon et de
l'Acier: Une ttude des Sources 32 (1958).
510. See, e.g., E.C.S.C. Treaty articles 53, 71-75; and particularly E.E.C. Treaty
article 113.
511. Cf. Ropers, Le MarchU Commun et la Justice Franiaise, 35 J.C.P. 1961.1.1629.
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tribunals of the States, judgments of the Court may fulfill the task of supple-
menting the "unwritten law."5 12 For instance, one of the gaps not filled by the
Treaties is the question of the res-judicata effect of the decisions of the
Court upon national, judicial, and administrative tribunals. Certainly, rules of
the "ordre public Communitarian," so important for the question of the
applicability of rules of State law and of the recognition of conclusiveness
of State decisions, will be based on "written" legal norms as well as on decisional
law developed by the CourtYx3
(b) Turning to the jurisdiction of the Court over matters governed by
Community law, a distinction must be made between the passing of judgment on
acts by the organs of the Communities, on the one hand, and mere interpreta-
tion of Treaty provisions on the other. The former belongs to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court according to both treaties, while only the E.E.C.
Treaty gives the Court exclusive authority in matters of interpretation. There
is no jurisdictional monopoly of the Court over the interpretation of the
E.C.S.C. Treaty. Accordingly, municipal courts maintain their power to
interpret this Treaty in litigations before them.51 4 More on this distinction will
be said in the following Subsection.
According to the Treaties, the power of the Court is, above all, that of
the control over the legality of the acts of the highest legislative or administra-
tive organs of the Communities, that is, of the Council on the one hand and
the High Authority (E.C.S.C.) and the Commission (E.E.C.) on the other.
Thus, the Court is given the exclusive authority to declare acts of these organs
of the Communities null and void on certain grounds. Just as the whole con-
cept of the annulment proceedings reflects the French influence, 15 so are the
grounds evincing illegality of the acts on which the demand for annulment can
be based patterned upon the appeal for annulment of administrative acts by
French law 16
There are four grounds on which an appeal for annulment can be based.
The first ground is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the authority which
originated the act. In this regard, it does not make any difference which of
the three aspects of jurisdiction-subject matter, space, or time-was involved. 1 7
Major violations of procedural rules form the second ground for appeal.
512. E.g., the Court in its judgment of December 10, 1957, Sociht6 des Usines de ]a
Sarre v. High Authority, 1/57 and 14/57, 3 Slg. 213, 235 referred to its decision of July 16,
1956 no. 8/57. See also Bebr loc. cit. (no. 486 supra) 58 Colum. L. Rev. at 782.
513. See also Ropers loc. cit. (note 486 supra) 36 J.C.P. 1962 I 1704.
514. The distinction can clearly be seen from a comparison of art. 41 of the E.C.S.C.
Treaty with art.*177 of the E.E.C. Treaty. For details see particularly Bebr, loc. cit.(note 486 supra) 58 Colum. L. Rev. at 789 et seq.
515. Art. 33 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty speaks of an "appeal" while art. 173 of the
E.E.C. Treaty uses the word "review."
516. "Contentieux de 1annulation." Cf. 1 Arminjon, Nolde and Wolff, Traite6 de
Droit Compar6 no. 214 p. 348 (1950).
517. In each of these three aspects the concept of "incompetence" of the French
administrative law is reflected. For the significance of lack of jurisdiction particularly of
subject-matter jurisdiction see Everling's article in "Der Betriebsberater" 1959, 52,
304
JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
Incidentally, the E.C.S.C. Treaty limits-in article 38-the jurisdiction of the
Court to these two grounds as for attacks on the legality of acts of the
Assembly or of the Council, whereas the E.E.C. Treaty excludes any such
attack on acts of the Assembly, but allows it against acts of the Council
on the same grounds as in appeals against acts of the Commission. 18 In
both Treaties the challenge of acts of the High Authority or Commission can
be predicated not only on the two grounds already mentioned but also on two
other grounds, namely, on the one hand "a violation of the Treaty or of any
legal norm relating to its application" and, on the other hand, "an abuse of
power."
(c) Now let us take up those two grounds of appeal. The meaning of
"violation of the Treaty" is clear; but it is not easy to find a generally accepted
answer to the question of what is the meaning of the companion phrase "any
legal norm relating to the application." Can the Court in the case of an order
of the High Authority acting in transgression of its power and apparently in
violation of an article of a State Constitution pass upon the meaning of that
article? To all probability, the answer should be NO.
In the case Friedrich Stork & Co.5 19 the Court said: "It is the function
of the High Authority to apply Community law. It lacks power to apply the
municipal law of the member States. Thus, the Court, according to article 31 of
the E.C.S.C. Treaty, has to ensure the observance of the law in the interpreta-
tion and application of the Treaty and of its implementing regulations.
Generally, it is not for the Court to sit in judgment on provisions of municipal
law. 520
Naturally, it is one thing for the Court to refer to a provision of 'State
law or to a principle or standard common to the law of all member States as
a means to an interpretation of Community law, or to apply State law rules
in an action which is not based on their violation, but might be based on
violation of Community law.521 But it is an entirely different matter whether a
violation of a legal norm which cannot be regarded as Community law is
sufficient to establish jurisdiction of the Court.
There can hardly be an argument that violations of laws or regulations
which had been enacted by a member State in compliance with its obligations
under the Treaty, are subject to the review of the Court. Furthermore, as
indicated previously, solutions of legal problems found by the Court in the course
of its work grow into the body of Community law. However, it is much more
difficult to agree with statements of a few writers to the effect that a reviewing
518. E.E.C. Treaty art. 173 (1).
519. Court, February 4, 1959, Friedrich Stork & Co. v. High Authority, case no.
1-58, 5 SIg. 43.
520. Id. at 63/4. [Author's translation.] As for art. 31 see note 487 supra.
521. See, e.g., the opinion in the Algera case (note 496 supra) 3 Slg. at 118 [inter-
pretation] and Court, March 20, 1959, Firma I. Nold, KG., vs. High Authority, case
no. 18/57, 5 SIg. 89 at 110. [Question of whether a corporation in liquidation has a
right to institute such a proceeding before the Court.]
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jurisdiction of the Court on appeals must be understood so as to extend to
violations of "international custom and universally recognized principles of law."
The words between quotation marks point to the provisions of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice concerning the sources of international
law.5
2 2
As may be recalled, "abuse of power" constitutes the fourth ground for
a challenge of an act of the authorities. The meaning of this ground is derived
from French administrative law. There, an administrative act can be challenged
upon the ground that the administrative organ exercised the authority granted
it, for an end different from that for which authority was conferred upon the
organ 623 In the French term "misapplication of power" (dbtournevient de
pouvoir) this meaning is well expressed. Examples are, on the one hand, acts
effected for the promotion of private interests or for the extension of favors
to a certain political group or for the satisfaction of a personal rancor.5 2 4
On the other hand, the Court has held that even acts resulting from a serious
lack of foresight or prudence may be attacked as abuse of power . 20
(d) As for the Court, additional light will perhaps be thrown upon
problems of its jurisdiction and the effect of its judgments by a few additional
remarks. As a rule, the Council or member State has the right to bring appeal for
the grounds discussed. Furthermore,, the E.C.S.C. Treaty grants this right-
in article 33 paragraph 2-to enterprises or associations, and the E.E.C.
Treaty-in article 173 paragraph 2-to "any natural or legal person." How-
ever, while the Council or a State may demand annulment of decisions5 20
without having to prove a special interest, all the other parties have a right
to appeal only as to those decisions whose addressee the appellant is, or which,
although addressed to another, affect their interests. 27
Thus, the question arises whether also the legality of regulations--"general
decisions" 528-- can be challenged by such parties. According to the E.C.S.C.
522. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 133 refer indeed to art. 38 of
that Statute, and see also the writings of other authors taking a different view, cited there.
523. Waline, Trait6 EImentaire de Droit Administratif 142 et seq. (6th ed. 1950).
524. 1 Arminjon, Nolde & Wolff, op. cit. (note 516 supra) 348.
525. Court, July 16, 1956, Fgdration Charbonni~re de Belgique vs. High Authority,
case no. 8-55, 2 SIg. 297, 317 relied on by Advocate General Roemer in the Nold case
cited in note 521 supra, 5 Sig. at 147.
526. The E.C.S.C. Treaty refers, in art. 33, also to "recommendations" while the
E.E.C. Treaty in art. 173 excludes them from a review by the Court. The explanation
for this divergence lies in the difference between the two treaties as to the meaning of the
term "recommendations." According to art. 14 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty they are binding
with respect to the objectives but leave the choice of proper means for attaining the
objectives to the addressees of the recommendations. By an interesting "change of meaning"
the same word as used in the E.E.C. Treaty must, according to art. 189 of this Treaty, be
understood as being devoid of any binding effect. Cf. Daig, Jurisdiction in the E.E.C. and
Euratorn, 83 Archiv des Offentliches Rechts, 132, 166 (1958, in German).
527. Bert6 and Miller, Common Market and Euratom, note 4 to Article 173 (1957,
in German); Daig, loc. cit. (note 526 supra) 169.
528. For their identity with regulations see Court, June 26, 1958, SociNtd des anciens
Atablissements Aubert et Duval v. High Authority, case no. 10/57, 4 S1g. 421, 438: "A
general decision establishes a legal norm and sets forth therein, in abstract form, the con-
ditions for its applications as well as the legal consequences." Daig, loc. cit. (note 525
306
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Treaty, enterprises can bring appeal against "general decisions" under two
limitations. On the one hand, the only ground on which the appeal can be
based by such a party is "abuse of power." On the other hand, the provision
of article 33(2) of the Treaty limits this right of appeal to regulations which
"affect" the appellant. In the view of the Court, an enterprise will be regarded
as being "affected" by abuse of power with respect to a "general decision"
(= regulation) if the compliance with it would have detrimental effects on the
business operations of the appellant.5 29
This is the point to refer to the E.E.C. Treaty. A party other than a
State, the Council, or the Commission can challenge only a decision under the
circumstances mentioned previously. The word "regulations" is omitted in article
173 of the E.E.C. Treaty; but article 174 shows that the concept of acts against
which appeals can be brought according to the former provision includes
"regulation." 530
As the wording of article 173 shows, the name given an act is not
determinative of its legal character. It is expressly stated that an act, although
it might have the form of a regulation or of a decision addressed to another
person than the appellant, must be regarded as a decision and therefore sub-
ject to an attack if it is of direct and specific concern to the appellant.5 31
(e) The Court does not sit as a board of revision to substitute its judgment
for that of the authorities of the Communities. This means that the function
of the Court is to control the legality of the proceedings of the authorities
and their determinations, but the Court has not the task to exercise the
discretionary functions which the Treaties have conferred upon them.53
This explains why the Court, as a provision of article 33 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty
emphasizes, "may not review the evaluation of the economic facts and
circumstances which lead to the decisions of the High Authority. .. ."
Naturally, as the provision just quoted expressly says,53 3 the Court will enter
into such an evaluation when the demand for review is based on "abuse of
power"; for such an abuse must, from the legal standpoint, be characterized as
an illegality,53 4 or at least as an obvious misinterpretation of a rule of Com-
munity law.535
supra) 166 and Matthies, The Law of the E.C.S.C. and the Member States Courts, 9
JZ 305 (1954, in German).
529. Court, June 21, 1958, Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- and Stahlindustrie etc. v.
High Authority, case no. 13/57, 4 Slg. 271, at 297 and see also the Court in the Aubert
et Duval case cited in note 528 supra, 4 Slg. at 439.
530. E.E.C. Treaty art. 174(2): "The Court shall if it considers it necessary point
out those effects of the regulation annulled which shall be deemed to remain in effect."
531. Cf. Daig ioc. cit. (note 526 supra) 169.
532. "Control of questions of law, not of questions of discretion." Daig, loc. cit.
(note 526 supra) 150; Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 110, 134.
533. Although the E.E.C. Treaty does not contain a similar provision, the definition
of the other Treaty must be read into the latter. Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479
supra) 134, Daig, loc. cit. (note 526 supra) 175.
534. Daig, loc. cit. 150, 175: "Article 33 is not aimed at a control of discretion but at
a review of questions of law."
535. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 33(1) (cl.2). This provision does not presuppose a violation
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(f) It is important to bear in mind that the Treaties have set a time
limit for the institution of proceedings for the annulment of an act of the
authorities of the Communities. Thus, if the appeals are not lodged within
one month-article 33(3) E.C.S.C. Treaty-or two months-article 173(3)
of the E.E.C. Treaty-from the date of the publication or notification of the
act in question,53 6 the act has become incontestable. As a result, proceedings of
the type discussed in the preceding pages are no longer available. In other words
acts can be annulled with effect erga omnes only prior to the expiration of the
limitation periods.5 37
It might, of course, happen that in a litigation before a municipal court
the question of the validity of an act of a Community authority may be a
prejudicial question long after the publication or notification of the act.
However, the way in which such an incident is to be handled and the effect of
an incidental decision asked of the Community court by the municipal court
in the proceeding before the latter, will be discussed in the following Sub-
section.
Furthermore, the E.C.S.C. Treaty, in article 36, gives an enterprise a
second chance to contest the "regularity" of acts concerning it before the
Court, despite the expiration of the limitation period. According to the wording
of this article, an enterprise is permitted to raise the point of illegality in con-
nection with its appeal from sanctions or penalties imposed upon it under
a provision of the Treaty.
Likewise, such a belated and therefore only "incidental review of the
legality1538 is not unknown to the E.E.C. Treaty. There, article 184 confines
such a contesting to "regulations"; but it does not limit it to appeals against
sanctions and penalties. It can be used in any legal proceeding which involves
such a "regulation." It will be seen in a moment that despite the apparent
dissimilarity between the two Treaties on this subject, there is enough
resemblance between them.
In a case brought before the Court through appeal against an individual
decision which did not concern sanctions or penalties, the High Authority put
in the defense of the expiration of the limitation period. The defense argued
that although the appeal against the individual decision was brought in time,
there had been no timely appeal against the regulation on which the
individual decision was based. The Court denied the defense. It is true, as the
Court conceded, that the wording of article 36 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty
provides for actions against decisions imposing sanctions and penalties. However,
of the wording of a Community rule, but an obvious misconception thereof, Daig, loc. cit.
175.
536. Failing in notification, the period commences from the time when the appellant
obtained knowledge. E.E.C. Treaty art. 173(3).
537. Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange to the Court, June 28, 1955 in
Assider v. High Authority, case no. 5/55, 1 Slg. 297 at 300.
538. German writers speak of an "incidental control of legal norms." Cf. Daig
loc. cit. 176, and 2 Groeben and Boeckh op. cit. 155.
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the Court stated that "it would be wrong to apply this article only to such
decisions; for the article enounces a general principle identical with the rule
expressed in article 184 of the E.E.C. Treaty."5 39
Naturally, in contrast to judgments rendered in principal proceedings, i.e.,
actions directed at the annulment of illegal acts, those incidental judgments
of the Court have binding effect only between the parties.
(g) After the Court has annulled the challenged act, the organ of the
Community which originated it, such as the High Authority (E.C.S.C.) or
the Commission (E.E.C.), has to take the necessary measures to give effect
to the judgment of the Court.540 Thus, it is left to the careful discretion
of the authority in question to choose among the various measures appropriate
for the achievement of the designed end.541
According to article 34(1) of the E.C.S.C. Treaty the annulment of a
decision afflicted, as the Court had declared, with a fault for which the Com-
munity is responsible, carries with it the obligation to give redress to the
enterprise or enterprises for the direct and special damage suffered by them as
a result of the wrongful act. Failure on the part of the High Authority to comply
with this obligation by offering equitable redress and reasonable indemnity, will
constitute a new basis for an "appeal" and for "damages" by new proceedings
in the Court.
(h) Of other bases of the jurisdiction of the Court, a few need here to
be mentioned. First of all, the draftsmen of the Treaties were aware that the
administration of justice would be defective if there were no remedy against
failure to act on the part of the institution of the Community which in the
given situation was, according to the rules of the Community law, required to
act. By both the E.C.S.C. Treaty and the E.E.C. Treaty the Court has juris-
diction over actions to remedy such a failure.
A gate to the institution of a proceeding is opened if the High Authority
(E.C.S.C.) or the Council or Commission (E.E.C.) continues in its inaction for
two months after a member State, or the party aggrieved by the inaction, 542
had required the authority in question to act.543
Concerning the procedural approach, the two Treaties differ. By article
35 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty the inaction is to be regarded as a "negative"
decision, namely, one of the denial of the requested act. Accordingly, the in-
action is treated as a decision 544 instinct with illegality and therefore subject to
539. Court, June 13, 1958, Meroni & Co. v. High Authority, case no. 9/56, 4 SIg. 9
at 26. See to the same effect Court, case no. 10/56, 4 Slg. 58 at 66 and case no. 15/57, 4
Sig. 159, at 190.
540. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 34(1); E.E.C. Treaty art. 176(2).
541. 2 Groeben and Boeckh op. cit. (note 479 supra) 142.
542. Consistently with the concepts of the E.C.S.C. Treaty, only an enterprise or an
association (in the meaning of art. 48 of the Treaty) has a standing to institute such a
proceeding, art. 35(1).
543. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 35(1) (3); E.E.C. Treaty art. 175.
544. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 35(3); Schlochauer, jurisdiction in the E.C.S.C., 3 Archiv
des V61kerrechts 395, 407 (1952, in German); Court, April 23, 1956, Groupement des
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such an appeal to the Court, which, as was discussed in the preceding pages, is
an action for a judgment declaring an act null and void.
However, in the view of the other Treaty (E.E.C.), the proceeding is for
a judgment characterizing the failure to act as a breach of Community law.ua"
According to both Treaties, a judgment against the authority in question
will direct it to take the measure or measures stated in general terms in the
judgment; for the Court will, of course, abstain from prescribing the contents
of the measures, a task which must be left to the administrative authority.540
Beyond this, a party damaged by the non-action has a right to indemnifica-
tion if the failure to act amounts to a violation of the official duties of one or
more of the persons in charge of the matter in question. From the standpoint of
the E.C.S.C. Treaty, this liability results from the judgment declaring the
failure to act to be an invalid decision.547 In the view of the E.E.C. Treaty, the
demand to indemnification pursues a right separate from that which seeks action
where there was wrongful inaction.648
Heretofore the discussion dealt with failures to act where acting was
required by a command of Community law. There is a difference worthy of
discussion between breaking one's duties by inaction, and forebearing the
taking a decision where there is power but not duty to do so. Accordingly,
discretionary abstention from acting is not subject to a judicial attack; other-
wise the exercise of discretion assigned by Community law to a quasi-legislative
or administrative authority would be supplanted by that of the Court.
Naturally, where the authority in question has abused its discretionary
power by failing to act, the conduct can no longer be regarded as an exercise
of discretion; it is the commission of legal wrong by omission and therefore
subject to the same treatment as the violation of a duty to act, a topic which
was discussed previously. The E.C.S.C. Treaty contains, in article 35(2), an
express provision to this effect. In the E.E.C. Treaty there is no such express
provision; but there can be no doubt that the principle applies also to abuse
of discretion of this kind within the realm of this Treaty. 49
(i) Member States are bound to comply with the obligations imposed upon
them under the Treaties.510 However, each Treaty has chosen its own method
Industries Sidrurgiques Luxembourgeoises v. High Authority, case nos. 7/54, 9/54,
2 Slg. 53.
545. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 139, 140.
546. Id. 140. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 34; E.E.C. Treaty art. 176. Daig, lo cit. (note
526 supra) 180.
547 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 34.
548. In this sense, the E.E.C. Treaty art. 176(1) deals in the first paragraph with
the measures required for the implementation of the judgment establishing the wrongful
failure to act; while the second paragraph refers to art. 215(2) which-see the discussion
in the preceding Subsection II-recognizes, along with art. 178(2) the jurisdiction of the
Court for such claims and the liability of the Community for damage caused by its
institutions or employees in the exercise of their duties.
549. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 138.
550. For the E.C.S.C. Treaty see art. 86; as for the E.E.C. Treaty see arts. 5, 6
and many specific provisions in, e.g., arts, 12, 16, 18, 23, 30-37, 53 and 67.
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to deal with the nonfulfillment by a State of its Treaty obligations. Both
Treaties are in agreement in one important point, namely the exclusive con-
ferment of judicial control over the subject on the Court.
According to the E.C.S.C. Treaty, the High Authority has first to render
a decision stating that the member State in question committed a breach of a
specific obligation, e.g., to amend any of the price tariffs of its railroads. 551
The decision of the High Authority will allow the government of the State a
specified period of time to rectify the breach. If the government of the State
questions the legality of the decision, it must assume the role of a plaintiff
by lodging an "appeal" with the Court within a period of two months from
the notification of the decision.552 If the Court arrives at the result that the
High Authority lacked, e.g., subject-matter competence and acted therefore
ultra vires, the Court will annul its decision. To illustrate, the Court did so
because the Treaty did not authorize the High Authority to require the State
to inform the authority of details of the purely national road haulage con-
tracts. 5 3 Conversely, if the Court does not find any legal fault with the decision
of the High Authority, it will reject the appeal of the State. 554
The procedural roles of the parties are reversed under the E.E.C. Treaty.
If the Commission is convinced that a member State has failed to fulfill an
obligation under the Treaty, it "must" communicate its reasoned opinion to the
State. If the latter does not comply with the terms established in the opinion
within the period of time stated therein, the former "may" bring an action
against the State in the Court. See article 169 of the E.E.C. Treaty. As one
sees, the first of the acts, i.e., the opinion, is a "must," the second, namely
the institution of an action, is a "may"; for it is left to the discretion of the
Commission which, therefore, if it prefers not to proceed with an action,
cannot be charged with a "failure to act."555 However, if the Commission fails
to form an opinion as to a State's noncompliance with its obligation, an action
for failure to act will lie against the Commission.556
A third significant aspect of the jurisdictional problem is the possibility of
an action brought in the Court by a member State against another member
State for a judgment declaring that the latter has violated obligations under
the Treaty.557
However, the Treaty, in order to avoid, as far as possible, litigations
between member States has set up an important condition precedent to the
551. See, e.g., Court, May 10, 1960, Government of Federal Republic of Germany
v. High Authority, case no. 19/58, 6 Sig. Msi.
552. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 88. Bindschedler, Legal Problems Concerning the European
Communityi 217 (in German).
553. See, e.g., Court, July 15, 1960, The Netherlands Government v. High Authority,
case no. 25/59, 6 Recueil 723.
554. See the German Government case cited in note 551 supra; the German Govern-
ment was also condemned in the costs.
555. See the last paragraph of the text in item h supra.
556. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 138.
557. E.E.C. Treaty art. 170. Cf. also art. 171 as for matter of judgment.
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right of a State to sue another State. The prospective plaintiff State must first
inform the Commission which, acting as a kind of a conciliator, will present
the other State with a reasoned opinion to which the latter may respond,
offering arguments. Failure on the part of the Commission to render such an
opinion within three months from the date of the receipt of the complaining
State's information does not lead to a proceeding against the Commission for
failure to act,558 but does authorize that State to institute the action in the
Court against the other State.559
By the E.C.S.C. Treaty the jurisdiction of the Court over any dispute
relating to the purpose of the Treaty can be invoked by one State against
another State, by an agreement on its jurisdiction; in addition, a State may
bring the action even in the absence of such an agreement where the controversy
concerns the direct application of the Treaty. 60
The subordination of the member States to the jurisdiction of the Court
in the question of alleged noncompliance with Treaty regulations is one thing;
the enforcement of the judgment is quite another. Concerning the latter problem,
there is a telling difference between the two Treaties.
The E.C.S.C. Treaty establishes a precise rule. If the State, after its appeal
had been rejected by the court,56 1 has not taken steps to fulfill its obligation,
the High Authority may, with the concurrence of the Council (acting by a
two-thirds majority), suspend the payments of sums which it may owe to the
State under the Treaty; and in addition, the High Authority may adopt certain
measures which otherwise-see article 4 of the Treaty-the States are not
allowed to take. Such measure are, e.g., charging of import duties, or dis-
criminations concerning manufacturers, distributors, or purchasers, etc. 02
By contrast, the E.E.C. Treaty lacks entirely any sanctions against the
disregard of the judgment by the defendant State. It is obvious that the Court
cannot resort to forced execution upon the judgment. However, the Treaty
does not even provide for any measures of indirect enforcement of the judgment,
such as required by the E.C.S.C. Treaty. The cavalier treatment of a member
State which breached the Treaty, conspicuous, as we saw, also in committing
the institution of an action to the free discretion of the Commission, shows
the radically different view taken by this Treaty from the approach of the
E.C.S.C. Treaty in the great divide between unrestricted sovereignty and
558. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 140: "Art. 170 is the lex
specialis which supplants the application of the general norm of art. 175.."
559. E.E.C. Treaty art. 170(4). There are a few situations in which, as for an
action in the Court against the State by another State or the Commission, the above
mentioned preliminary steps are dispensed with by Treaty provisions. See, e.g., art. 93[in the case where the defendant State had granted an aid which is not compatible with
the Common Market]. See also art. 225. [Other measures taken in the interest of national
security but with the effect of distorting competitive conditions in the Common Market.]
560. E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 88 and 89.561. The rule applies of course also in the absence of an appeal because then thedecision of the High Authority has become res judicata.562. E.C.S.C. Treaty art 88(3). The State may appeal to the Court from a decisionpronouncing such sanction. See art. 88(4).
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subordination to a supranational policy commanded by 1he idea of Community.
To avoid an understatement, we may say that the E.E.C. Treaty receded sub-
stantially from the supranational principles of the E.C.S.C. Treaty.16
In due consideration of space limitations, our discussion refrains from
presenting here further details concerning the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court.
5 6 4
IV
ENsURING UNIFORM INTERPRETATION oF TREATY LAW IN STATE PROCEEDINGS
(a) The Treaties have preserved the principal jurisdiction of the State
courts. Accordingly, aside from the relatively few types of litigations subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court, the municipal courts have to sit
also in disputes which involve the interpretation of Treaty provisions. Let
us assume that a French industrialist entered into a contract with a German
business enterprise and that in an action brought by the former against the
latter in a French court-the jurisdiction being based on article 14 of the
French Civil Code-the defendant enterprise's defense that a contract is void
according to article 65(4) of the E.C.S.C. Treaty565 because of its tie-up
features, would be rejected. However, this judgment will have no res-judicata
effect in a German court. 6 6 A German court in an action on the same contract,
with the parties' roles in reverse, might come to the opposite result. Why?
It must not be overlooked that the Treaties failed in both the establishment of
uniform bases of jurisdiction for litigations in State courts involving Community
law and the mutual recognition of judgments thus rendered.567
Aware of this shortcoming, the contracting governments adopted article
220 of the E.E.C. Treaty voicing the exhortation that "the member States shall
engage in negotiations with each other with a view of ensuring the simplification
563. Daig, loc. cit. (note 526 supra) 188.
564. The French constitution, like the constitutions of the other member States, provides
that treaty law prevails over domestic law. Art. 55 of the French constitution, 1958, inserted
the qualification that this rule shall apply if the supremacy of treaty law is also the rule in
the other contracting State or States. Whether the Constitutional Council, which has the task
to examine the constitutionality of a French legislative act prior to its promulgation, must
be regarded as a municipal court and therefore be obligated to refer to the Court (of
the Communities) when treaty law is involved, is a nice question. Cf. Ropers loc. cit.
(note 511 supra), 35 JCP 1961 I 1624 (B)(1). Theoretically, the German constitutional
court could find for the unconstitutionality of a law ratifying a treaty; but an attempt
to attack such a law will not work in practice. For reasons see Stein and Hay loc. cit.
(note 473 supra) at 397/8. The Court of the Communities has exclusive jurisdiction
over litigations concerning the obligation of member States and decisions of the Board
of Governors and Directors in matters of the European Investment Bank. See art. 180
E.E.C. Treaty.
565. By art. 65(1) (4) agreements and concerted practices tending to restrict the
normal operation of competition within the Common Market are void. This will be
discussed later.
566. Lack of reciprocity, required by § 328 no. 5 of the German Code of Civil
Procedure is a reason to deny a foreign judgment recognition. For details see Chapter
XII Section 2 Subsection B Division 3 infra.
567. Martha Weser, Les Conflits de jurisdiction dans le cadre du Marc" Commun,
48 Rev. 613, 619 et seq. (1959).
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of the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and execution of judicial
decisions and of arbitral awards." So far, no agreement embracing the Six has
been worked out in this matter and not even bilateral conventions have been
concluded between all of them. 68
Furthermore, it would seem that there are in member States jurisdictional
rules still in effect and operation which run counter to principles of Community
law. Article 7 of the E.E.C. Treaty pronounces the important principle that
"within the field of application of this Treaty . . . any discrimination on
the ground of nationality shall be prohibited." It has not escaped the attention
of lawyers that, if we may present only two illustrations, the application of
article 14 of the French Civil Code or of §23 of the German Code of Civil
Procedure as bases of jurisdiction in actions against a national of a sister
State560 might be violative of Community law.5
7 0
Although the removal of jurisdictional differences would certainly lessen
the number of decisions which are in conflict with each other with respect to
the application and interpretation of Community law, uniformity in this regard
can be achieved only by unification through Conventional provisions, which
would confer the ultimate authority in that domain upon one single court.
Whether to some extent this result has already been reached by methods set
up in the Treaties, will be seen from the following discussion.
(b) The main difficulty which the Treaties sought to overcome lies in the
Janus-faced nature of Community law. It is the law that the member States have
in common; but it is simultaneously also the national law of any of the
member States which by ratifying the Treaties have incorporated their pro-
visions into the national law.571 As we already saw, the conferment by the
Treaties upon the institutions of the Community of power to enact regulations
or render decisions which prescribe not only objectives but also the means to
be employed, constitutes as essential part of the Treaties. It could hardly be
questioned that the ratifications of the Treaties carried with them the anticipa-
tory recognition of the accordance of the exercise of such delegated power
with the national constitutions.572 However, the problem of accordance of those
acts which are initiated by the institutions of the Communities, with the
Treaties themselves, that is, the question of the validity of the acts, remains.
In order to effect uniformity throughout the member States, at least con-
568. To illustrate only, no treaty on this subject exists between France and Germany,
Belgium and Italy, or France and Germany with The Netherlands.
569. As repeatedly stated in this book, by article 14 of the French Civil Code
French courts have jurisdiction in personam if the plaintiff is a French citizen, against
any defendant regardless of whether he is a French citizen, or a foreigner without
domicile or residence in France. The German Code of Civil Procedure § 23 provides forjurisdiction in personam over a non-resident, particularly a foreigner, on the mere fact that
assets of the latter are within the territory of Germany.
570. Cf. Martha Weser, loc. cit. (note 567 supra) at 622 et seq. and 635 et seq.
571. Daig, loc. cit. (note 526 supra) 194; Stein and Hay, Legal Remedies of Enter-
prises in the E.E.C., 9 Am. J. Comp. L. 376, at 400 (1960).
572. See particularly Behr, loc. cit. (note 486 supra) 58 Colum. L. Rev. at 782 et seq.
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cerning this question, the E.C.S.C. Treaty has clothed the Court with
exclusive jurisdiction to review the validity of acts of the Hight Authority or
of the Council. Article 41 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty enounces the principle that
whenever in a litigation before a municipal court of a member State the validity
of such an act, e.g., a decision of the High Authority, is contested, the municipal
judge shall be obligated to stay the proceedings and to refer the issue to the
Court. 573 This duty does not depend on a motion of a party. According
to the wording of article 41, the mere challenge of the validity of a decision of
the High Authority or the Council is sufficient to compel the reference to the
Court, even if in the view of the judge the validity of the act in question is
beyond any doubt. 574
There can be no other time limitation than the limitation provided by
the State law which controls the litigation. The Court's decree declaring the
decision of the High Authority invalid has a binding effect only upon the parties,
while, as we saw in the preceding part of this Section, the effect of the Court's
judgment obtained in a principal annulment proceeding, which under article
33 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty is limited in time, operates erga omnes. By contrast,
no time limitation for the submission of an issue to the Court according to
article 41 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty can be read into the provision either by its
language or by the policy behind it.
Likewise, there is no hint in this article 41 that the lack of validity alleged
by a party must be based on one of the four grounds which article 33 requires
for an "appeal." But it is hard to think of other bases than those grounds,
because of the wide range encompassed by them.
Let us assume that invalidity of a decision of the High Authority or the
Council, because of its being in conflict with a provision of a State constitution,575
is alleged in a State court litigation. After the judge referred the issue to the
Court, the latter might come to the conclusion that there is no such conflict, but
even if there were one, it would base its decision only on the question whether
the authority violated Community law, e.g., by exceeding its power. The Court
573. Cf. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 41. As for the proceeding, see the Rules of Procedure
art. 103 § 2: "The decree of the municipal court certifying the issue to the Court is
served upon the parties to the (municipal) proceedings, the High Authority, the member
States, and the Council." Every one of the addressees can file a declaration or arguments
within two months after service. For the further proceeding see id. art. 44.
574. Lagrange, The Court of the E.C.S.C., 70 Revue du Droit Public, etc. 417 at 430
(1954, in French). See also the convincing remarks of Bebr, loc. cit. (note 486 supra) 58
Colum. L. Rev. at 791: "To grant to such an invalidation an effect erga omnes would
make administration chaotic and almost impossible."
575. By constitutional amendments in The Netherlands and Luxemburg in 1953 and
1957 the supremacy of the law of international treaties over the national constitutions was
established. Such is not the case in the other member States. However, French courts
have always refrained from passing on the conformity of a treaty with the constitution.
In their view, this question must be left entirely to the executive branch of government.
By Italian law, the Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the constitutionality
of treaty law which Belgian judges-incidentally-have never examined. For a discussion of
the problem of the relation of the E.C.S.C. and the E.E.C. Treaties to the constitutions of
the Six see Bebr, loc. cit. (note 486 supra) 58 Colum. L. Rev. 775-781 and Int. L. & Comp.
L.Q. Suppl. (note 486 supra) at 2-7.
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has taken the view that the High Authority and other institutions of the
Community are to be guided by Community law without being controlled
by rules of municipal law.5 76
It can be said that, with one exception to which we will turn in a minute,
the national courts will have to determine, when the litigations before them
involve questions of community law, the effects upon private law which may
result from acts of Community institutions, particularly from decisions of the
High Authority.577 Thus, the application of Community law in preference over
national law in such litigations must be distinguished from the fact that the
jurisdiction on the whole has remained in the hands of the State courts. As a rule,
they have to decide on the legal consequences arising from the impact of Com-
munity law upon any contracts and other transactions involving restraint of
trade and competition. However, as mentioned before, there is a very important
exception to this rule.
An examination of this exception must begin by the statement that
article 65 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty in its first paragraph prohibits all restrictive
agreements and practices tending to interfere in any way with the normal
operation of competition within the Common Market.578 This prohibition
of the Treaty, which is Immediately binding upon enterprises, is primarily
designed to assure competitive pricing as well as freedom of movement for
goods and for other factors of production.
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The High Authority has been clothed by the Treaty with the power to
demand all information necessary for its decision; for it has the exclusive
powers to decide what facts constitute a violation of the prohibition.580 If
parties want to avoid the serious sanctions placed upon agreements thus
proscribed, they may petition the Authority for an approval of an agreement
which they intend to conclude. Note, furthermore, that the Treaty, in the first
clause of the fourth paragraph of article 65, expressly declares that agreements
which fall under the prohibition shall be null and void. The provision adds that
such an agreement "may not be invoked before any court of the member States."
Two very important and interesting conclusions follow from this strict
command of the Treaty. First. The municipal courts shall have no jurisdiction
over such agreements. It is the Court of the Community which has exclusive
jurisdiction. Second. The national courts will continue of course to apply
576. Cf. the Court in the Stork & Co. case (cited in note 519 supra). See also advocate
general Roemer in the Nold case cited note 521 supra, 5 Slg. at 161 et seq., and Steindorff,
The Provisions Against Restraint of Competition in the European Community Treaties
and the National Law. (Offprint from Beitr~ige fiur die Internationale Kartellrechts
Konferenz) 191, 202 (1961).
577. Bebr, loc. cit. (note 486 supra) 58 Colum. L. Rev. at 770.
578. The text of art. 65(1) of the E.C.S.C. Treaty is more explicit: "All agreements
between enterprises, all decisions of associations of enterprises, and all concerted practices
tending, directly or indirectly, to prevent, restrict, or distort the normal operation of
competition within the common market are hereby forbidden."
579. Steindorff, op. cit. (note 576 supra) 192.
580. E.C.S.C. Treaty article 65(3).
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the rules of national law, particularly also of the national cartel and antitrust
laws, but always subject to the provision of the fourth paragraph of article
65.581 Accordingly, if by a rule of the national antitrust law the agreement at
issue were allowed, the national court cannot apply the rule of the national
antitrust law when under article 65-the only Treaty provision of private-
law character 58L-the agreement is void.
However, aside from such a conflict with Community law, the national
law, for instance concerning the validity of a contract or the form prescribed
for it, controls. The entertainment by a national court of an action brought
for damages against an enterprise by a merchant alleging a violation of the
prohibition of article 65, does not impinge upon the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court. How does the interplay between Community law and municipal law
operate? If there was already a decision of the High Authority that the
contract in question ran counter, e.g., in its price feature to the proscription
of article 65 of the Treaty, then it is readily apparent that the decision is
binding upon the national court, provided that there was no appeal taken in
time by the defendant from the decision to the Court,5 3 or that, on such an
appeal, the decision was confirmed by the Court.58 4
If there was not yet a decision of the High Authority, the national court
will recognize that the exclusive jurisdiction over the legality of the contract lies
with the High Authority, and will, therefore, request a determination from it.5s 5
To illustrate, plaintiffs, German wholesale dealers in coal, demanded in a
German court an injunction to enjoin the general representative of the six
largest sales organizations of Ruhrcoal from continuing a new sales practice
which in the plaintiffs' view was proscribed by article 65 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty.
The German court turned to the High Authority and requested its decision
on the matter. 8 6 This case was settled by the defendants' yielding to the
plaintiffs' demands. However, if they had contested the validity of the
decision of the High Authority, the German judges would have been obligated
to refer the question of validity to the Court.
Although article 41 does not say it in these words, it seems to be reasonable
to support a municipal judge's abstention from a reference to the Court where
it is obvious that there is not the slightest connection between the allegedly
illegal practice of the defendant enterprise and plaintiff's claim. For this
reason the French Cour de cassation approved the attitude of the courts below
and declared that even if the layoff of the plaintiff and of other employees
581. Steindorff, op. cit. (note 576 supra) 204.
582. Bebr, loc. cit. (note 486 supra) 58 Colum. L. Rev. at 770.
583. For such "appeal" see the discussion in the preceding Subsection III(b) (c) (d).
584. E.C.S.C. Treaty article 65(4)(2): "The High Authority shall have exclusive
powers, subject to appeals to the Court .... .
585. Steindorff, op. cit. (note 576 supra) 202 refers to decisions in which German
courts have recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Authority.
586. Cf. Landgericht Stuttgart August 8, 1953, 4 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 140
(1954).
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resulted from an allegedly illegal type of concentration of enterprises, the
termination of an employment relationship in accordance with the terms of
the employment contract cannot be regarded as prohibited, since the norm
prohibiting the alleged conduct of defendant is not addressed to its employer-
employee relationships.58 7
However, what, if anything, could be done in the case of a municipal judge's
refusal to refer a relevant issue to the Court? On the one hand the E.C.S.C.
Treaty, unlike American constitutional law, has failed to vest the Court with
any reviewing power over municipal courts in cases of the latters' infringements
upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Community. 588 As stated previously,
Community law is simultaneously national law. 89 A violation of the
jurisdictional commands imposed upon the national courts by articles 41
and 65 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty is by the law of the States a reversible error
which is to be remedied by way of appeals to the highest national courts;
but their judgments, whether correct or erroneous, will become res judicata.
It should be noted that, in general, according to article 66(1) of the
E.C.S.C. Treaty concentrations of enterprises, particularly mergers or acquisi-
tions of shares or assets, require the preliminary authorization by the High
Authority which shall grant it if it is found that the transaction satisfies the
specific requirements stated in the Treaty.,90 If a concentration had been
started without such an authorization and if the concentration does not meet
the requirements for authorization, the High Authority shall, as the second
paragraph of the fifth section of article 66 of the Treaty directs, render a
reasoned decision denouncing the concentration as illegal. In addition, the
High Authority shall order the enterprises which had entered into such an
illegal transaction to divest themselves of the stockholdings or other financial
interests concentrated, and to break up the combination by restoring the
pre-concentration status and take any other action which the High Authority
considers appropriate to re-establish the independent operation of the enter-
prises and to restore normal conditions of competition.
In contrast to the private-law norm of article 65 of the Treaty which de-
clares all agreements restraining the normal operation of competition within the
Common Market null and void, article 66, dealing with illegal concentrations,
does not contain such a private-law norm. Furthermore, unlike article 65(4)
of the Treaty, article 66 avoided determining the exclusion of national juris-
diction over questions of concentration. Prior to a decision of the High
587. (French) Cass. civ. soc. sec. December 11, 1959 J (Clunet) 1961, 121.
588. It is obvious that a refusal of a municipal judge implies a denial either of
the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Authority to determine the question of a violation
of article 65 or of the Court's jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the determination
of the High Authority.
589. See the text preceding the reference to note 571 supra.
590. Cf. E.C.S.C. Treaty article 66(2). If a concentration should occur without a
request being made for such an authorization, the parties are subject to substantial
fines, but if the requirements set up by the Treaty are met, the concentration will be
approved ex post. Treaty art. 66(5).
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Authority holding a concentration to be illegal, the effects of such an illegal
transaction must be tested by the rules of the national legal system which
according to the conflict law of the national forum controls the transaction; it
seems, however, very improbable that a party disputing the validity of a
concentration directly affecting his interest would not have called the attention
of the High Authority to the transaction in question.
The decision of the High Authority condemning the concentration is,
of course, subject to the appeal to the Court, according to the provision of
article 33 of the Treaty. However, article 66 (5) (2), referring to article 33, adds
that the appeal may not be lodged until the deconcentration measures have been
ordered, unless the High Authority agrees to the lodging of a separate appeal
against the decision. At this point it is well to remember that an "appeal" as
provided for in article 33 must be based on one of the four grounds stated
therein; but article 66 in the second paragraph of its fifth section expressly
directs that "notwithstanding the provisions of article 33, the Court shall
have full jurisdiction to judge whether the operation effected is a concentration
within the meaning of the first section (of article 66) and of the regulations
issued in execution thereof."
Regarding the subject of concentration, we see that the jurisdictional
picture is somewhat confused, yet it seems to be clear that the Court has
exclusive jurisdiction to pass judgment on the question whether the transaction
at issue is a concentration within the meaning of Community law, and, if
so, whether it is afflicted with illegality. 591
Certainly these two questions are not the only ones involving problems
of jurisdiction. We have to bear in mind that deconcentration measures are
governed by State law. The Treaty provides that if the parties do not comply
with a decision ordering to take such measures, the High Authority itself
shall take steps to carry into effect the decision by* which the illegality of the
concentration had been pronounced. It is therefore provided by article 66(5) (5)
that the High Authority may even suspend the exercise of rights attached to
the assets thus illegally acquired, which might amount, therefore, to a suspension
of the exercise of the right to vote the shares. According to that provision
the High Authority may even proceed to a forced sale of such assets either
directly or through a receiver-administrator 592 who will be appointed by the
competent national court.
No doubt, the operation of such measures depends on municipal law; and
the question has been raised whether municipal courts have jurisdiction also
over controversies arising out of the carrying out of such measures. Aside
from actions brought by interested parties to recover for damage caused by
an official fault relating to such a deconcentration measure, 593 the Treaty itself
591. Bebr, loc. cit. (note 486 supra) 58 Colum. L. Rev. at 772.
592. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 66(5) (5). Krawielicki, the Prohibition Against Monopolies
in the Schuman-Plan 77 et seq. (1952, in German).
593. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 40(1).
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is silent on the question whether the Court has jurisdiction over actions by
parties whose rights or interests have been adversely affected by deconcentra-
tion measures.594 Because of the limits imposed upon the jurisdiction of the
Court, it can be argued with good reasons that national courts can assert
jurisdiction over disputes of that type.595
(c) The E.C.S.C. Treaty has failed to secure a uniform interpretation
of Treaty law. It made the Court the supreme interpreter of Treaty law and acts
of Community authorities only in two sporadic cases, namely the case of
article 41 concerning the challenged validity of resolutions of the High
Authority and of the Council on the one hand and, on the other, the case of
article 65 prohibiting anti-competitive contracts. 96 Thus, for the largest
part, the provisions of the E.C.S.C. Treaty and of quasi-legislative and executive
acts of the authorities are subject to the free interpretation by State courts.
By contrast, the E.E.C. Treaty created the basis for, and ensured,
uniformity of the interpretation of Community law,5 97 by granting the Court
"prejudicial jurisdiction" on this matter.598 This means, as article 177 of the
E.E.C. Treaty states, the power of the court to make a preliminary decision
concerning particularly 5 9 questions of the interpretation of the E.E.C. Treaty,
and of the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
European Economic Community.
Thus, article 177 of the Treaty provides that "where any such question
is raised before a court or tribunal of the member States, such court or tribunal
may, if it considers that its judgment depends on a preliminary decision on this
question, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any
such question is raised before a domestic court or tribunal from whose decisions
no appeal lies under municipal law, such court or tribunal shall refer the
matter to the Court of Justice."
The difference made by this provision between discretion ("may") and
duty ("shall") of the municipal court as to the submission of such a question
to the Court, finds its explanation in the hierarchical order of the municipal
courts. If a lower court failed to make such a request, its attitude could be
corrected by a higher court to which the case comes through appeal; for the
highest court from whose decision no further appeal lies, must submit the
request to the Court of the Communities.
The Contracting Powers have laid down in the provision of article 177
a general procedural principle for the ideological basis of which comparative
594. Bebr, loc. cit. (note 486 supra) 58 Colum. L. Rev. at 773.
595. Id. at 773, pointing to the dangers which might result from the lack of Com-
munity jurisdiction to the objectives pursued by the Treaty.
596. Daig, loc. cit. (note 526 supra) 195.
597. Catalano, La Comuniti Economica Europea e l'Euratom 36 (1957).
598. The French legal language uses the term "compdtence prejudicielle," see Ropers,
loc. cit. (note 486 supra) 36 JCP 1962 I 1709 (A).
599. Art. 177 of the E.E.C. Treaty extends this jurisdiction also to the interpretation
of the charters of any bodies set up by an act of the Council where the charters so provide.
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law offers some analogues.600 As the quoted text of article 177 shows, the
principle is expressed in broad terms. Consequently, important questions still
call for an answer which must, therefore, be derived from an interpretation
of article 177 rather than from its text.
We may ask first of all what is the "ruling" which is requested of the
Court of the Communities? In the first case which was presented to the Court
under article 177-it was the famous case Robert Bosch GmbH v. Geus °6 0 1
the noted German manufacturer of refrigerators asked in the action instituted
in the Rechtsbank (= district court) in Rotterdam to enjoin the Dutch defend-
ant from selling in The Netherlands refrigerators sold to him by a German
dealer in violation of a clause of the latter's contract with plaintiff. The clause
forbade the dealer from exporting refrigerators without plaintiff's consent.
Defendant put in the defense that according to article 85(1) and (2) of the
E.E.C. Treaty the clause was automatically null and void.602 In plaintiff's
view those provisions of article 85 had not yet entered into effect since the
regulations referred to in article 87 of the Treaty, as required for the applica-
tion of article 85, had not yet been adopted. The Rechtsbank shared in this
view and gave judgment against the defendant. On the latter's appeal the
Hof (= Appellate Court) at The Hague decided to submit a request to the
Court according to article 177 of the Treaty for a ruling.
Two questions are very important in this connection. First, what was
the contents of the request? Second, what was the Court's "ruling" on the
case? The request directed to the Court asked "for a determination of the
question whether the prohibition of exportation imposed by the plaintiff upon
its purchasers, who agreed to it in their contracts with plaintiff, was null and
void under article 85(1) and (2) of the E.E.C. Treaty603 as far as the
prohibition concerns exportation to The Netherlands."
In his conclusions Advocate General Legrange pointed out that if the
request of the Dutch court had to be construed literally, the Court (of the
Communities) would lack jurisdiction. It does not lie within the cognizance of
the Court to decide on the question whether the contractual clause specified
600. According to the Austrian Constitution of 1920, art. 89(2), a court considering
the applicability of a governmental regulation to be doubtful because of its illegality must
stay the proceeding and submit its motion for repeal of the regulation to the Constitutional
Court. The German (Bonn) Basic Law of 1949 adopted in art. 100 this idea with respect
to the question of constitutionality of a statute, the validity of which is pertinent to the
decision of the court. In such a case the court has to refer the constitutional question to
the Constitutional Court. The British Foreign Law Ascertainment Act, 1861, provided for
the remission of a case to a court of a foreign state which observes a reciprocal attitude,
for ascertaining the law of such state as to the facts of the case.
601. Court, April 6, 1962 no. 13/61; 8 SIg. 99.
602. Art. 85(1) and (2) of the E.E.C. Treaty prohibits, because of their incompatibility
with the Common Market, certain agreements between enterprises, any decisions by
associations of enterprises, and any concerted practices "likely to affect the trade between
member States . . . . and resulting in prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the Common Market, in particular those consisting in . . . price fixing or limitations
or control of production and markets ... "
603. See the preceding note.
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in the request of the Dutch court falls under the prohibition of article 85
of the E.E.C. Treaty. Thus, in its view, the Court cannot pass judgment
on the question of the applicability of article 85 to the concrete case; for
the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the rendition of an opinion on the
"interpretation of the Treaty.0 60 4
In approving these arguments, the Court referred to the words just quoted
because in the view of the Court these words, employed by article 177, point
to what is the subject of the interpretation by the Court. And the Court con-
tinued to say that, accordingly, the Court can, regardless of the formulation of
the request of the national court, decide only within the limits of its jurisdic-
tion, which means it can decide only on an (abstract) question concerning the
interpretation of the Treaty.605
Following this line of reasoning, the Court rendered an opinion pronounc-
ing that, until the regulations provided for in article 87 of the E.E.C. Treaty
would come into effect, the application of the nullity clause of article 85(2) of
the Treaty must be deferred (except for certain exceptional situations specified
by the court). Since substantive antitrust law of the Community is not within
the program of this book, this casual reference to the Court's opinion may
suffice. 06
From what has been said, it seems clear that there is no basis for any com-
parison between this "prejudicial proceeding" of article 177 of the Treaty and
the Anglo-American institution of certiorari which provides for submitting of
concrete questions, if not of the whole record by the lower tribunal to the higher
court. Nor can the proceeding under article 177 be compared with appeals to
a court of last resort under the procedural laws of the member States. It is true
that by these laws, the appeals-e.g. the French-Belgian-Luxemburgian Pour-
voi en cassation, the German "Revision," the Italian ricorso per cassazione and
the Dutch "cassatie"-are exclusively on the law. However, the courts of last
resort in dealing with these appeals review the challenged decision as to whether
the proper substantive or jurisdictional rule of law was applied to the specific
facts607 of the case.
The Bosch Company lodged an appeal (cassatie) from the decision of the
Dutch appellate court to the highest court of The Netherlands contesting the
relevancy of Treaty law for the decision of the case; and it moved in the
"Court" (of the Communities) for a stay of the proceeding there until the
disposition of its appeal. The Court declined to grant the stay. In its view the
604. For this point in the conclusions of the Advocate General see 8 Slg. at 133-135.
But see Bebr, loc. cit. (note 486 supra) Int. & Comp. L.Q. Suppl. at 14.
605. Court, April 6, 1962 (note 601 supra) 8 Sig. at 110.
606. At this writing, the only discussion published in English concerning the substantive
law significance of the Bosch case is to be found in Angelo and Scott, The European
Comnon Market: New Problems in Anti-Trust Regulation 48 Am. Bar Ass'n J. 634 (1962).
607. This points to the facts according to the findings made by the courts below.
See, e.g., for French law Morel, op. cit. (note 12 supra) no. 667 p. 514; for German law
Rosenberg, op. cit. (note 174 supra) § 140 III.
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internal law of a member State on the one hand, and the Community law on
the other, constitute two legal systems independent of one another. Accordingly,
the Court's jurisdictional authority is established by the submission of a national
court's request based on article 177 of the Treaty, and is not depending upon
any further examination as to whether the national court's decision to submit
the request to the Court has become incontestable according to the national
law. 08
Turning to the requirements for a request, we note first that article 177
uses the words "where such question is raised . . . ." Can a judge on his own
motion make the request to the Court? An affirmative answer seems proper. 0°9
Unlike Anglo-American common-law concepts, procedural law in the six civil-law
countries does not prevent a judge from taking steps held necessary for the
adjudication of the cases before him.
It may also be noted that article 177 speaks of a "court or tribunal before
which such a question is raised ... ." The language and the purpose of this
article seem to remove any doubts that its command is directed not only to
judicial courts, but also to administrative tribunals.
A few more interesting problems remain for examination. If the judge of
the national court believes that, to quote from the language of article 177, his
judgment in the pending case "depends on the preliminary decision on such a
question"6 110 and therefore decides to submit to the Court of the Communities a
request for a ruling, is this Court bound by the national judge's decision? It
seems that the prevailing opinion is in favor of an affirmative answer.0 1 1 As a
result, the Court of the Communities cannot engage in an examination as to
whether the question submitted is relevant to the adjudication of the litigation.
The power to decide on this question remains with the national court.6 12
Next, we reach the question whether a national judge is justified in abstain-
ing from referring a preliminary question relating to the interpretation of a
Treaty provision to the Court, because he cannot imagine that the provision
could conceivably be given an interpretation different from his own. Several
legal writers have not agreed with this justification. 613 In their view, the
preservation of uniformity in the interpretation of Treaty law within the
Common Market lies at the core of article 177. Without leaving room for any
exception, the Treaty, in their opinion, directs that the Court alone shall have
the ultimate power to interpret Treaty law. As a result, national courts shall
always leave the interpretation to the Court of the Communities. However,
608. Court, April 6, 1962 quoted note 601 supra 8 S1g. at 110.
609. To the same effect Daig, loc. cit. (note 526 supra) 196.
610. For the kind of "questions" subject to an opinion of the Court see the text fol-
lowing the reference to note 599 supra.
611. Daig, loc. cit. (note 526 supra) 196; 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note
479 supra) 146.
612. Stein and Hay, loc. cit. (note 571 supra) 395.
613. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 146; Bebr, loc. cit. (note 486
supra) 58 Colum. L. Rev. at 794 and Int. L. & Comp. L.Q. Suppl. at 13; but see Ropers,
loc. cit. (note 486 supra) 35 JCP 1961 I 1624(I) (A).
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there are a few decisions of national courts which did not request a ruling of
the Court although, e.g., the application and meaning of article 85 of the E.E.C.
Treaty, mentioned previously,6 14 was an issue.01 5
The answer requested of the Court to a prejudicial question must not be
regarded as a mere advisory opinion; for it is binding upon the national court
as to its decision in the pending litigation. True, no article of the Treaty
expresses a command that the requesting court is obliged to follow the opinion
of the Court. However, in the first place, the denial of such an obligation
would affect the achievement of a uniform interpretation of Community law.010
In the second place, Treaty law supplies even a technical argument by the
provision of article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court. The provi-
sion assumes that the trial court will stay the proceeding because of its request
directed to the Court. The interruption of the proceeding would make little
sense if the basis for the decision of the case would remain, after the long stay,
the same as before the submission of the request to the Court of the Com-
munities.
It may be well to add that if the national courts violate the obligations-
by failing to refer a relevant preliminary question to the Court or by disregard-
ing the latter's opinion-appeal may be lodged with the higher State courts.
Absence of an appeal or its denial, or violation of the obligations by the court
which is the final instance in the pending case, lays the litigation at rest. The
reasons are obvious. On the one hand the Treaty provides, as we saw, for an
action in the Court for the setting aside of acts of the Community authorities
on the ground of illegality; but the Treaty shrank from clothing the Court with
reviewing power over the national courts or tribunals. On the other hand, in all
the six States the independence of courts is very strongly guaranteed in their
constitutions. It can hardly be said that among the obligations assumed by
the Contracting States toward the Community an interference with a judg-
ment of their courts which had become res judicata, was included. Thus, an
action by another member State or by the Commission against a State for the
failure of its courts to live up to the obligations mentioned before, could not
be conceived by any stretch of the imagination.
In passing, it might be noted that the binding effect of the Court's ruling
under article 177 is limited to the litigation in which it was requested. Since
the Court renders only abstract comments on a Treaty provision, comparable
614. For the contents of article 85 see note 602 supra.
615. O.L.G. Dusseldorf October 21, 1958, 13 Betriebsberater 1110 (1958) [vertical
price fixing scheme limited to the domestic market, held, not to be illegal under article
85]. See also Rechtsbank, Zutphen (Netherlands) July 11, 1958, 13 Betriebsberater 931
(1958) [division of markets of Belgium and The Netherlands in cardboard tubes, held, article
85 inapplicable since for the time being it is not yet in force]. However, note the view taken
by The Hague Court in the Bosch case, referring the question of the effectiveness of article
85 to the Community Court. For a review of the first two cases see Steindorff in 8 Archiv
des ViJlkerrechts 426-440 (1960).
616. 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) at 143; Bebr, loc. cit. (note
486 supra) Int. and Comp. L.Q. Suppl. at 15.
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to a theoretical analysis of a legal norm, its opinion might in subsequent cases
have the significance of a secondary authority.
(d) From what has been said in the preceding pages, it can be seen that
the law of the European Economic Community may play an important role in
litigations before the national courts or administrative tribunals or agencies,
not only under the aspect of a provision of the Treaty as such, but also be-
cause of the numerous acts of the institutions of the E.E.C., particularly its
chief executive, the Commission. The validity of such acts may be attacked in
State proceedings. Naturally, it may be attacked by direct appeal to the Court,
a subject which has been discussed in a preceding subsection. 617
As may be recalled, the E.C.S.C. Treaty provides in article 41 for the
exclusive judicial control by the Court over an act of the High Authority or
the Council regardless of the expiration of the time limit for a direct attack,618
whenever in a litigation before a municipal court the validity of such an act
is contested. The E.E.C. Treaty goes even further.
From the previous quotation of article 177 of this Treaty619 it could be
seen that, when a "question of the validity or the interpretation of an act of an
institution of the European Economic Community" 620 is raised in a proceeding
before a municipal authority, the latter has, if it considers the question relevant
for its decision, to refer it to the Court. As in the case of the control provided
for in article 41 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty, so in the case controlled by article 177
of the E.E.C. Treaty, the validity of an act of a Community Authority may be
questioned although the limitation period for a direct attack under article 173
of the Treaty has expired.
The provision of article 177 is one of first importance; for the article
provides supreme judicial control by the Court over the interpretation of Com-
munity law, particularly Community anti-trust law. This calls for a few addi-
tional remarks.
In contrast to the E.C.S.C. Treaty,621 the E.E.C. Treaty does not give its
chief executive, the Commission, the exclusive power to declare as null and
void agreements which are "bad" ententes.62 Thus in a litigation, a national
judge or an administrative authority may decide on a question concerning such
ententes, subject of course to the exercise of the prejudicial jurisdiction of the
Court under article 177 of the Treaty. Accordingly, judicial and other authorities
617. See Subsection III(b-f) supra.
618. See in this Subsection IV, part b, the text following reference to note 574 supra.
619. See the text following the reference to note 599 supra.
620. Cf. article 4(3) of the E.E.C. Treaty: Assembly, Council, and Commission.
Daig, loc. cit. (note 526 supra) 197; 2 Groeben and Boeckh, op. cit. (note 479 supra) 145.
621. Article 65(4) of the E.C.S.C. Treaty: "The High Authority shall have exclusive
powers . . . to rule on the conformity of such agreements . . . with the provision of this
article." As for a survey of the contents of this article see the text accompanying the
notes 578-581 supra.
622. Such bad ententes are particularly agreements and concerted practices of the
kind defined in article 85(1) of the E.E.C. Treaty, being declared null and void, in article
85(2). For the contents of article 85(1) see note 602 supra.
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of member States can exercise jurisdiction concerning article 85 dealing with
such ententes until the Commission becomes interested in such a matter.
Needless to say that the Commission can, at any time, at the request of a
member State or ex-officio investigate ententes and trade practices from the
standpoint of violation of article 85, or inquire whether monopolistic business
positions or practices run counter to the prohibition stated in article 86.023 If the
Commission finds that there were violations of those Community rules or pro-
hibitions, it has the power not only to take proper measures to bring them to
an end, but it may, if such a violation continues, render a decision confirming
the existence of the violation; all acts of the Commission are of course subject
to a direct appeal to the Court.
Thus, as soon as the Commission takes jurisdiction of a case, the member
State concerned is ousted of jurisdiction. As we saw, the question whether there
was a violation of article 85 or 86 of the Treaty may come up in a proceeding
before a national court or agency and the validity of the act of the Commis-
sion, even if it had not been appealed from in time, will be examined by the
(Community) Court in exercise of its prejudicial jurisdiction according to
article 177.
All this displays a picture of an almost confusing concurrence of jurisdic-
tions. However, there is one matter which is exclusively in the jurisdiction of
the Commission. Article 85 in section 3 of the E.E.C. Treaty recognizes excep-
tions from the prohibitions and nullity provisions of the first two sections by
providing for the validation of "good" ententes. Article 87 of the Treaty refers
to general regulations implementing the rules of articles 85 and 86 to the enact-
ment of which the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community
is authorized by the Treaty. The first such Regulation, No. 17, with the effective
date of March 13, 1962, prescribes that no party may invoke the exceptions of
article 85 section 3 unless the entente in question has been notified to the
Commission. Then, according to article 9(1) of the Regulation, the Commis-
sion has "full competence," subject, of course, to the control of the Court, to
declare the first two sections of article 85, dealing with bad ententes, inapplicable
according to the dispensation provisions of the third section of article 85.
623. Cf. E.E.C. Treaty, article 89(1); Angelo and Scott, loc. cit. (note 606 supra)
at 638.
